thereafter, steadily switched their attentions to more global horizons. This City elite is seen as making an materially positive contribution to Britain's trade in invisibles and its economic performance over the last 150 years. Apart from Cassis (1994) , who has documented the considerable "weight" of the world of high finance in social and political Britain before 1914, most authors have been less charitable, claiming a decisive tilting of government economic policy in favour of City interests at the expense of industry, and a reluctance to seek the business of industrial firms with any degree of enthusiasm.
14 Augar (2001) has criticised the gentlemanly, amateurish approach of the British merchant banks and brokers pre-Big Bang, whilst lamenting their subsequent demise.
One manifestation of the power and influence of the gentlemanly capitalists was the Accepting Houses Committee (AHC) first established in 1914, and comprised of the merchant banking establishment. These banks ruled the world of City finance from the second half of the nineteenth century until Big Bang in 1986, 15 and their dominance fostered the emergence of established business attitudes and practices. 16 One such practice was the fixed-price offer, the dominant method used by firms conducting an Initial Public Offering (IPO) on the LSE. 17 Occasionally, other methods were adopted. In 1961, a small property developer, Parway Land and Investment, was the first private firm to go public by auctioning its shares on the London Stock Exchange (LSE). This tender offer was a success. All shares were successfully sold and the share price rose a modest 14.3% on the first day of trading considerably less than the rise for previous IPOs over that year to date. The rise in initial trading over the offer price, called "underpricing", is one measure of how accurately the issuing firm is able to gauge the valuation placed on it by public investors once trading begins. It is one benchmark of the informational efficiency of the stock market. 18 A few 14 Pollard (1982), p.86-87; Ingham (1984) ; Newton and Porter (1988); and Hutton (1994) . 15 Big Bang refers to the wholesale deregulation of the LSE, but particularly the liberalisation of fixed brokerage commissions, the opening up of LSE membership to foreign ownership and the ending of the prohibition on share broking and jobbing being conducted by the same firm. Thomas (1986) . 16 Thompson (1997) . 17 I adopt the terminology IPO in preference to "new issue" which denotes either an IPO, or a "further issue" undertaken by a firm already listed. In Britain, most further issues are rights issues where the existing shareholders have a pre-emptive right to subscribe to new issues in proportion to their existing shareholding. 18 Underpricing has been extensively analysed in the financial economic literature. See Jenkinson and Ljungqvist (2001) , ch.3.
years later, the first British empirical study of IPO underpricing unequivocally recommended the tender method, 19 but, despite such advocacy and the substantially lower underpricing delivered by tenders over the ensuing years, this innovation was adopted by only 1 in 12 firms going public up until its disappearance shortly after Big Bang.
Beginning in the interwar years, there emerged a new breed of institutional investor hungry for ordinary share investments. Firms responded by issuing ordinary shares rather than preference shares or debentures. This new "equity culture" propelled institutions to majority ownership of the UK stock market by the mid-1970s. 20 The issuing houses, 21 led primarily by the merchant banking members of the AHC, were initially slow to switch their attention from underwriting foreign bonds and did not commit to industrial ordinary share issues until the formation of the Issuing Houses Association in 1945. As IPO activity surged during the early 1960s, this new business became an increasingly important and profitable activity alongside merger and acquisition advice. The issuing firms themselves, however, did less well when judged by rising underpricing exacerbated by a failure to adopt the tender method. As the twentieth century progressed, the LSE embraced a number of anti- in Big Bang. Fixed underwriting fees and a subdued level of entry or exit suggest that the issuing houses were also subject to little or no competitive pressure. As a consequence, the tender offer remained underutilised at a cost to private firms going public in proceeds forgone of between £700 million and £1.3 billion in 2005 prices.
The missed opportunity of the tender offer is an example of capital market failure to be set alongside inefficiencies in the merger and acquisition process 23 and is evidence of the difficulties faced by Britain post-1945 in full pursuit of a stock market-oriented approach to corporate finance when confronted with now familiar asymmetric information and agency 19 Merrett, Howe and Newbould (1967) . 20 Briston and Dobbins (1978) . 21 Issuing house refers to any bank, or investment trust, specialising in sponsoring and underwriting new issues. Around the time of Big Bang, they became known as investment banks reflecting US influence and the merger with broking and jobbing firms. 22 Michie (2001) . 23 See Morris (1998) for a summary; Owen (1999) , ch.14.
problems between firms and investors. This missed opportunity is as much about a lack of competition in UK investment banking as it is about information asymmetry problems. Whilst there is no denial of the contribution made by merchant banking to the overall export performance of the financial services sector, nor of an ability at times to develop such new markets as the Eurodollar and Eurobond markets, 24 firms going public could have been better served. This conclusion is in keeping with the view expressed by Broadberry and Crafts (2001) regarding the poor innovation performance of British manufacturing industry in the absence of a competitive stimulus.
The next section discusses the development of the IPO underwriting market in Britain and argues that there was a lack of competition prior to Big Bang. Section II describes the features of the tender offer compared to alternative issue methods and its frequency of use.
Section III presents the evidence for substantially lower underpricing of IPOs by tender offer and section IV considers reasons why tender offers were not more enthusiastically adopted by the market. Section V briefly comments on events since Big Bang and section VI concludes.
I
Whereas firms had issued preference shares and debentures at least as often as ordinary shares in the three decades before WW1, 25 during the interwar years, issues of ordinary shares were on the increase 26 and became the preferred vehicle for firms raising finance on the stock market from the 1950s onwards. 27 The Economist first pointed out in 1929 that issuers were selling their shares at a price below levels at which they began 24 Broadberry (2005) . 25 Cottrell (1980) , ch.6. 26 Thomas (1978) and Scott (2002) . 27 Between 1949 and 1953, three-quarters of equity new issues by UK quoted firms were of ordinary shares and one-quarter were of preference shares, Tew and Henderson (1959) respectively. 30 A recent long-run study of underpricing on the LSE from WW1 has concluded that underpricing was relatively modest prior to WW2 and only became a more persistent problem thereafter.
31
In the period of this study 1946-86, a firm going public usually retained an issuing house to sponsor its IPO. Invariably, the shares were also underwritten, or, in other words, the issuing house would contract to purchase at the offer price any shares not taken up by investors. In this way, the firm effectively leased the issuing house's reputation in order to certify its quality to public investors, and, thereby, raised the probability of its shares being successfully sold. Davies and Yeomans (1975) , Dimson (1979) , Buckland and Davies (1990) , Levis (1993) , Jenkinson and Trundle (1990) and Ljungqvist (2003) . 30 This average is the reported annual underpricing for each year weighted by the number of IPOs in that year, whereas the average for 1946-86 weights each IPO equally. 31 Chambers and Dimson (2006) . 32 Finnie (1934) p.137-60; Thomas (1978), p.39; The Economist, 5 Jul. 1924, p.13. 33 Harris (1933) , Andrews (1937 Roberts (1992), p.268-269; Diaper (1986), p.59; Macmillan Committee (1931) , para.386. 35 Chambers and Dimson (2006 Thomas (1986) , ch.3.
II
Issuing firms are concerned with maximizing IPO proceeds subject to ensuring liquidity in post-IPO share trading by achieving a reasonable spread of ownership. 44 In addition, it is likely that managers were increasingly motivated to disperse shareholdings in order to retain control of their business as the threat of hostile takeover materialised in the wake of the 1948
Companies Act, 45 a point to which I return below when discussing my results. There was also a desire by issuers to avoid the undersubscription of their IPO and a consequent poor start to life as a public company.
46
From at least WW1 until Big Bang in 1986, an IPO on the LSE was usually conducted by way of the fixed offer price method. The issuing firm and its sponsors set the offer price and made no subsequent adjustment in order to balance demand and supply following discussions with investors. Fixed-price offers were of two main types: public issues, and offers for sale.
47
Public issues involved an offer of shares in the issuing company by prospectus directly to investors at a fixed-price, usually by an issuing house or broker. Offers for sale are very similar with the only difference being that an issuing house, or broker, first buys the shares from the company, or its selling shareholders, and then offers them to the public. A third issue method was the placing. This also involved the issuing house, or broker, first buying the shares from the issuing firm, or its shareholders, at an agreed, and then distributing them to a relatively small number of their investment clients. Popular with small firms, this method differed from a prospectus issue in that the timetable was shorter, and direct IPO costs, including underwriting, accounting, and legal fees, were lower.
48
Despite advantages of speed and cost, placings had a tendency to result in higher indirect costs, namely, underpricing. In the rest of this paper, given their similar features and 44 Although, LSE listing requirements did not stipulate any minimum number of shareholders, shares needed to be distributed sufficiently widely to establish a market in the shares and thereby to obtain the LSE's granting of a quotation. 45 Hannah (1983) , p.149-50. One quarter of quoted firms on the LSE were acquired in the 15 years following the Act. 46 Buckland, Herbert and Yeomans (1981) . 47 Thomas (1978), p.38-43, and Trundle (1990) give summaries of the various issue methods.
48 Jenkinson and Trundle (1990) compare direct IPO costs as well as indirect costs, or underpricing, by IPO method.
susceptibility to excessive underpricing, I contrast fixed-price offers and placings, on the one hand, with tenders on the other.
A tender offer is a form of auction. There is an extensive literature on auction theory relating to IPOs. 49 The vast majority of tender offers in Britain were simultaneous uniform price auctions. Each investor submitted a single, sealed bid for a block of shares at a specified price at or above a minimum tender price. Auctions of financial securities are generally characterised by large numbers of bidders, a feature which typically lowers the risk of investors colluding to submit low bids and buying securities on the cheap. A minimum price also acted as a reservation price, further deterring investor collusion. Once all bids were submitted, the issuing firm under advice from its issuing house allocated shares at a single strike price. If the IPO was oversubscribed, the strike price was set somewhere above the minimum price, but below the market-clearing price, and shares were allocated pro rata to investors; if undersubscribed, the offer price was fixed at the minimum tender price, and the underwriting issuing house had to purchase at this minimum price those shares not tendered for.
Having previously restricted the use of tenders to the few stock issues made by water utility companies, the Stock Exchange Council first rejected a request for a relaxation of this restriction at the end of 1959 before finally approving a tender offer of ordinary shares in June 1961. 50 Approval was forthcoming because of a desire to avoid further instances of heavily-underpriced IPOs, and because of the difficulty of valuing Parway Land and
Investments' property portfolio given that much of it was still under development. investors, between 220 and 230. Given the desire to establish a liquid market post-IPO, successful applicants received only a pro rata allocation of the shares they tendered for, as set out in Appendix 2(ii), rather than being allotted in full. Hence, after scaling down, 1194 investors were allocated shares at a strike price of 15s. 9d.. The tender was successful both in achieving an offer price 2s. 9d. above the minimum price of 13s. and in ensuring a reasonable spread of ownership.
The overwhelming advantage of the tender was that it gave issuers the option to sell shares at closer to fair value, as defined by initial trading in the shares on the stock market.
It allowed a firm to estimate the demand curve for its shares at the time of the IPO, something that was not feasible in the case of a fixed-price offer, where any issuing firm was reliant upon the expertise of its advisers in setting the offer price. The Renwick Wilton & Dobson IPO demand curve for shares above the strike price is graphed in Figure 2 , and its downward sloping feature is typical of tender offers in this period.
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In theory, Renwick
Wilton & Dobson had the option of price discriminating by accepting each application at the price tendered, starting with the 200 shares tendered at 30s., rather than setting a uniform price. However, in practice all but two firms undertaking tenders opted for a uniform strike price. Being concerned for the interests of the small investor, the LSE feared that retail investors might submit excessively high bids in their efforts to secure a share allocation, and would suffer large capital losses in initial trading, should price discrimination be permitted.
Between 1960 and 1986 tender offers represented only 8% of all IPOs (Table 3) . the fixed-price offer in favour of book-building, a method designed to estimate the fair value of an issuing firm more accurately.
III
There were 1455 IPOs between 1960, when the tender offer for an IPO was first proposed to the LSE, and the end of 1986, the date of the last such offer by a private firm.
The data sources on issue terms, issue methods, and firm characteristics, and variable definitions are described in Appendix 1, along with summary descriptive statistics and a correlation matrix. Tenders unquestionably delivered lower underpricing compared to fixedprice offers both across the whole period as well as in each decade (Table 4 ). Mean underpricing of tenders was 6.45% compared to 10.44% for fixed-price offers and 20.48% for placings between 1960 and 1986. All equally-weighted means reported in Table 4 are statistically significantly different from zero at the 1% level, as are the differences between the means of tenders and fixed-price offers and of tenders and placings over the whole period 1960-86. Tenders also exhibited lower median underpricing than either of the traditional issue methods (4.28% versus 6.67% and 12.45%). Furthermore, the proportion of IPOs with positive first-day returns (RET>0%) was higher than that for fixed-price offers (84% versus 74%), suggesting that tenders were not so aggressively priced as to invite price falls in initial trading any more frequently than fixed-price offers. Placings, on the other hand, were so attractively priced as to almost guarantee a rise in share price since all but 5% generated a first-day return.
One of the reasons given for the first IPO by tender, Parway Land, was that its shares were risky, lacked comparable quoted companies, and were therefore difficult to value.
According to the empirical finance literature, the riskier is the firm going public, the greater its susceptibility to underpricing. 55 The riskier a firm is, the more likely it is to choose the tender method, other things being equal. Firm risk is proxied by its market capitalisation (MCAP), age (AGE), the number of years of historic profits disclosed (TRACK), dividend yield 55 Beatty and Ritter (1986); Jenkinson and Ljungqvist (2001), chapter 3.
(DIVYLD), and whether or not it is engaged in research and development (R&D). Incentives also influence the choice of issue method.
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Management of IPOs selling a substantial portion of the firm's equity (PROPSOLD), and selling their own shares in the IPO (VENDOR)
are highly motivated to maximise IPO proceeds. Definitions of all IPO characteristics are described in Appendix 1(ii). For the same reason, these tenders by large firms were more likely to be underwritten by AHC members compared to placings, mainly chosen by small firms.
Given the differences in characteristics of firms choosing tenders compared to fixedprice offers and placings, I estimate the impact of the tender method on underpricing by controlling for these characteristics as well as underwriting arrangements, industry risk, and equity market conditions, for the entire sample of IPOs between 1960 and 1986. I employ a simple linear underpricing model of the form: RET = β 1 *TENDER + β 2 *PLACING + β 3 *LNMCAP + β 4 *LN(1+AGE) + β 5 *DIVYLD + β 6 *TRACK + β 7 *PROPSOLD + β 8 *VENDOR + β 9 *R&D + β 10 *AHC + β 11 * MKTRET + β 12 * SEDOL + β 13 * YEAR + ε 56 Jenkinson and Ljungqvist (2001) . 57 There was more existing shareholder selling for tenders compared to placings in 1960-69, but the difference was not statistically significant.
where RET is the percentage change in the closing price on the first day over the offer (strike)
price adjusted for the change in the equity market index. TENDER is a dummy variable taking the value 1, if the IPO is conducted by tender offer, and 0 otherwise. PLACING is a dummy variable taking the value 1, if the IPO is conducted by the placing method, and 0 otherwise. A full set of YEAR dummy variables is included, and the constant is suppressed.
YEAR takes a value of 1 for the year in which the IPO first trades and 0 otherwise. All other right hand side variables are as defined in Appendix 1(ii).
The results from an OLS estimation of the above model are summarized in Table 6 .
The coefficient on the tender dummy variable in regression 1 indicates that this method lowered underpricing by 9.8% across the whole period compared to fixed-price offers and by an additional 4.5% compared to placings (regression 1, Table 6 ). The underpricing advantage of tenders was sustained through the sub-periods 1960-69 and 1980-86, when tenders were used (regressions 2 and 3). The overall explanatory power as indicated by the adjusted R-squared statistic appears low, but this is not unusual for regressions of this type.
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The cost of not making greater use of tenders was substantial. Every additional 1% in underpricing of fixed-price offers and placings cost issuing firms £128 million in forgone proceeds in 2005 prices. Applying a 9.8% underpricing advantage for fixed-price offers and one of 14.3% for placings to real gross proceeds of £10,892 million for fixed-price offers and £1,948 million for placings ( 6.45%, and that, as before, placings were underpriced a further 4.5%, a lower bound estimate of total "money left on the table" would be £600 million in 2005 prices.
Since the Conservative government of the day did not primarily aim to maximise proceeds in preference to the promotion of wider share ownership among the general public by offering an attractive level of underpricing, both sets of estimates exclude privatisations.
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Even ignoring privatisations, the underpricing problem was, in all likelihood, more costly for
British industry in view of the greater volume of IPOs in this period compared to its major European competitors.
60

IV
Given its success in lowering underpricing, why then was the tender not employed in more than 8% of IPOs after 1960?
Contemporary comment alleged that tenders deterred "stags" 61 from participating in IPOs, and that they left IPO pricing to uninformed investors rather than an experienced issuing house. 62 However, in spite of the reduced presence of stags, there were only six instances of undersubscription among the 118 tenders, a lower proportion than that experienced by public offers. 63 As for the alleged shortcomings of IPO pricing being left to uninformed investors, its underlying premise was that the traditional fixed offer price method had the merit of the issuing house and the broker utilising their expertise and market intelligence to set the offer price reasonably close to fair value. Yet, the underpricing evidence is to the contrary. Although a more legitimate, contemporary criticism of tenders was the lack of transparency in the basis of allotment in cases of oversubscription, and the 59 Jenkinson and Mayer (1994 associated tendency to discriminate against large applications from institutions, 64 the allocation basis of fixed-price offers was no more transparent or less discriminatory.
A common defence of fixed-price offer underpricing was that the initial return left a "sweet taste" in new investors' mouths, and, accordingly, would induce them to look favourably on the company following the IPO. If this were true, one would expect the issuing firm to exploit this feel good factor by offering additional shares to investors not too long after the IPO. However, Jenkinson (1990) found that in the second half of the 1980s firms going public were actually less likely to make further issues in the five years after the IPO than were existing quoted (seasoned) firms in the same period. In fact, those IPOs making further issues were less underpriced than those that did not. Additionally, if the sweet taste hypothesis were true, one would expect firms choosing the tender offer in expectation of lower underpricing to be less likely to make further issues than those opting for the fixed- One potential advantage of the fixed-price offer, not commented upon at the time, was the greater flexibility allowed managers in dispersing share ownership after going public.
Brennan and Franks (1997) studied a small sample of 69 UK fixed-price offers in the late 1980s, and concluded that underpricing was positively related with post-IPO ownership dispersion. However, there is no reason, in principle, why fixed-price offers should provide greater flexibility than tender offers in this regard. In the earlier example of the Renwick Wilton and Dobson IPO, when balancing its desire to maximise proceeds against the spread of ownership, the management had a choice as to exactly where on the IPO demand curve between the minimum price and market-clearing price to strike its offer price. Those managements particularly concerned about control set a lower strike price, other things being equal. It is ultimately an empirical question as to whether firms going public by tender had less dispersed ownership structures, and were therefore more vulnerable to takeover.
A more likely explanation for the virtues of the tender being overlooked is the inertia of the underwriting community. 65 The majority of issuing houses experimented with tenders without ever wholeheartedly embracing the concept. In all, 32 IHA members underwrote 88 tenders, and the 30 remaining tenders were underwritten by 19 separate broking firms. The lack of competition among issuing houses before Big Bang manifested itself not only in fixed underwriting fees, as previously argued, but also in the absence of any apparent tendency of underwriting market share to vary inversely with the degree of underpricing, as one might expect.
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Controlling for IPO risk characteristics, I estimated the model of underpricing outlined in the previous section by OLS, including a dummy variable for each of the ten issuing houses with the largest market share in underwriting fixed-price offers over the period 1960-86 (results not shown). None of these dummy variable coefficients were statistically significant and negative, the implication being that no issuing house built its market position on a record of lower underpricing. Consistent with this evidence, the issuing houses felt little need to compete for IPO business by recommending the tender method more aggressively to their clients.
How well were the interests of an issuing house in handling IPOs aligned with those of an issuing firm aiming to minimise underpricing? Direct fees received by the issuing house from the firm increased with IPO proceeds, and, therefore, decreased with the extent of underpricing.
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Provided firms were happy with their IPO experience, a decision in part based on the achieved level of underpricing, the issuing house faced the prospect of additional fee business from its latest corporate client. On the other hand, the issuing house's effort in marketing the IPO and its lead underwriting risk decreased with underpricing. In theory, firms contemplating an IPO could shop around for an issuing house, and, thereby, punish anyone with a reputation in the market for excessive underpricing. In practice, significant information asymmetry between firms and banks made this difficult, and, 65 "Equity issue by tender -efficient but seldom used", The Times, 14 August 1967, p.18. 66 Buckland, Herbert and Yeomans (1981) found no tendency of market share to vary inversely with underpricing between 1965 and 1975. 67 As well as the 0.5% advisory fee, the lead underwriter would retain a portion of the subunderwriting.
hence, there is little evidence of competition for underwriting business based on the underpricing record of any given issuing house.
In mitigation of the issuing houses, institutional investors were equally happy to maintain this status quo. As already noted, the sub-underwriters of IPOs, and rights issues, were the very same investment institutions who applied for shares in the IPO, and who, therefore, had a dual interest in seeing the shares underpriced. Not only would they be allocated shares at a favourable price, they would also earn an attractive sub-underwriting fee. Marsh (1979) tenders was therefore at least as great as the slack in the underwriting of rights issues.
Following Marsh (1979) , it is possible that this slack represented side-payments arranged by brokers in return for the brokerage commissions arising from the day-to-day share dealing of institutions keen to remain on sub-underwriting lists. In contrast, issuing houses did not enjoy any such quid pro quo in a pre-Big Bang era, when they could not own brokers, and, as a result, could not transact directly with institutional investors. Although they would have an interest in maintaining the general support of these institutions for the smooth running of the IPO market, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that this support was bought at too high a cost for issuing firms. Beneviste and Busaba (1997) . 73 Sherman (2005) . 74 Degeorge, Derrien and Womack (2005) .
concluded that underpricing of UK IPOs along with other non-US IPOs has been mitigated by the book-building approach. Notwithstanding this evidence, there remains a vigorous debate as to the relative merits of book-building and the tender offer.
75
VI By the 1960s, underpricing was recognised as a problem for issuing firms in Britain.
Whilst some element of underpricing was necessary to avoid undersubscription and the adverse publicity associated with shares registering a loss on their debut, the margin of underpricing endemic to fixed-price offers and placings was just too great. Having successfully experimented with the tender offer as a solution to this problem and despite its delivering almost 10% lower underpricing than the fixed-price offer, the leading issuing houses failed to exploit their innovation in more than a minority of cases. Competition in IPO underwriting between issuing houses was distinctly lacking and they, along with the broking community and their institutional investor clients, were content with the traditional method of issue. In the nineties, IPO methods at last underwent significant reform when gentlemanly capitalism was "finally undone by the massive inflow of foreign capital after Big Bang".
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Over the previous quarter of a century, the total proceeds forgone by firms going public was substantial, and at least as great as the estimated inefficiency of rights issue underwriting which was sufficiently serious to warrant an investigation by the MMC at the end of the 1990s.
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Appendix 3: Robustness of regression results
Underpricing is defined as the first-day return adjusted for market movement. It is possible that underpricing may be underestimated if share prices of IPOs continue to rise relative to the market after the first day. This is not, however, the case. Levis (1993) found that mean partial first-month returns, namely, the change between the offer price and the share price at the end of the first month of trading and adjusted for the movement in the market index, did not differ statistically from mean first-day returns for the period 1980-88. As an additional check, I
estimated partial first-month returns for IPOs between 1960 and 1965, and again the mean was not statistically significantly different from that for first-day returns.
When the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of one plus the first-day return adjusted for market movement, the estimated underpricing benefit of tenders is lower at 6.85%
( 1960-86), 8.02% (1960-69) and 5.34% (1980-86) and the coefficient on the tender dummy is statistically significant at the 1%, 1% and 10% levels respectively. To take account of outliers observations, I re-estimating the underpricing model by Weighted LS and applying a trimmed mean weighting function. This lowers the benefit of the tender method over public offers to 6.7%, whilst compared to placings the benefit increases to 5.8%. Both results are still highly statistically significant.
It is possible that that the proxy measure of underwriter reputation, the AHC dummy variable, is endogenous in regressions with underpricing as the dependent variable. 78 The sign of the AHC dummy coefficient could be either negative, under the hypothesis that reputable issuing houses certify the quality of IPOs to new investors, or, positive, if the issuing houses exercise market power and extract underpricing rents. Endogeneity arises because firms liable to suffer higher underpricing are inclined to choose a reputable issuing house that can minimise the degree of underpricing. Without correction, this can lead to bias in the estimated coefficients of an underpricing model under OLS. Normally, this is dealt with by employing instrumental variables to estimate predicted underwriter reputation in the first stage of a two stage least 78 Habib and Ljungqvist (2001) squares regression of underpricing. In the period 1960-86, there is a lack of suitable instrumental variables which are uncorrelated with underpricing which makes such estimation infeasible.
